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Abstract
Trade liberalization has opened up the food market in many transitional 
economies. Th is has created an opportunity for smallholder farmers to access 
higher-value markets, but it has also exposed them to competition from trading 
partners. Key issues in linking smallholder producers to higher-value markets 
are overcoming the diseconomies of size, poor infrastructure, lack of market 
signals for quality, high transaction costs, and the poor quality associated with 
traditional supply chains. A common suggestion made by many development 
workers and politicians to overcome these problems is to encourage farmers 
to form collaborative marketing groups. Furthermore, there is a common 
misperception that market intermediaries are taking advantage of the farmers 
and are the primary cause of poor farm-gate prices. Some schemes which 
aim to help smallholder producers access higher prices (e.g., Fairtrade) insist 
that farmers be part of a cooperative that delivers the product to market. 
Unfortunately, there is abundant evidence from the experience of smallholder 
farmers in the transitional economies that collaborative marketing groups 
are seldom competitive in either the traditional market or the emerging 
market. Th is paper will look at the question of if and under what conditions 
smallholder farmers in the transitional economies are likely to benefi t from 
forming collaborative marketing groups. It will use evidence from the literature 
and the author’s experiences in researching the success of marketing groups in 
the Philippines and Papua New Guinea. Th e main fi nding is that most are 
doomed to fail unless key prerequisites exist: a comparative advantage for the 
group and a suffi  cient level of social capital and trust in the community. A lack 
of social capital and trust in PNG and the Philippines means that collaborative 
structures need to incorporate mechanisms that prevail over this problem.
Keywords: comparative advantage; cooperative; institutional structure; 
social capital; trust 
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Abbreviations:
 CMG - collaborative marketing groups
 IOF - investor-owned fi rm
 NGO - nongovernment organization
 PNG - Papua New Guinea
Introduction
 In a review of the role of collaborative marketing groups (CMG) in 
developing countries, Murray-Prior (2007, p. 7) concluded that two factors 
were critical to the successful establishment of a CMG: “a comparative 
advantage . . . generally arising from a market failure; and a reasonable level 
of trust amongst the members of the community seeking to establish the 
CMG.” In this paper, these issues are discussed with particular reference to 
the Philippines and Papua New Guinea using evidence from the literature and 
the author’s experience with groups in these countries.
Murray-Prior (2007, p. 2) defi nes a CMG as “a group of farmers who 
have organized to collectively market their produce.” Th is defi nition includes 
structures such as cooperatives, growers associations, cluster marketing groups, 
and bargaining cooperatives. Th e reason for the broader defi nition beyond the 
normal focus on cooperatives is that, in many cases, less-formally organized 
structures enable farmers to overcome some of the defi ciencies of cooperative 
structures, particularly as they are legislated in some countries.
 Recent multilateral trade agreements through the activities of the World 
Trade Organization and bilateral free trade agreements have opened up the 
food markets in many transitional economies. In theory, this has created the 
potential for smallholder farmers in these economies to access higher-value 
markets, but it has also exposed the smallholder farmers to competition from 
their trading partners in two main forms: higher quality and lower price. Shifts 
in consumer preferences and technological and institutional developments have 
accentuated the problems for smallholder farmers with the increase in value 
chains dominated by large international retailers. Th ese chains deliver a large 
range of products and require vertical coordination (Kirsten and Sartorius, 
2002) to provide traceability and quality assurance (Brennan, 2004).
 To overcome these problems, many development agencies and experts 
encourage collective or collaborative eff orts by smallholders to enable them 
to compete in these markets (Manalili and Ellson, 2003; Shigetomi, 2006). 
However, CMGs have a history of failure in many transitional economies. 
 Key issues in linking smallholder producers to value chains are overcoming 
the diseconomies of size, poor infrastructure, lack of market signals for quality, 
high transaction costs, and poor quality associated with traditional supply 
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chains (Murray-Prior, 2007). Two key issues which make it more diffi  cult 
for smallholder farmers to achieve market share in high-value chains are the 
characteristics of small farmers themselves (e.g., poverty, illiteracy, low status, 
and power) and their external environment (e.g., poor transport infrastructure 
and poor access to inputs, credit, and information). Smallholder farmers cannot 
compete in these markets on their own. Th erefore, they must collaborate, but 
their characteristics and external environment make it more diffi  cult for them 
to collaborate successfully.
 In discussing the question of if and under what conditions smallholder 
farmers in the Philippines and PNG are likely to benefi t from forming 
collaborative marketing groups, this paper will draw heavily on the review 
by Murray-Prior (2007). It will summarize the discussion on the following: 
reasons for the formation of CMGs, reasons for the success and failure of 
CMGs in the transitional economies, and its implications for the conditions 
under which small farmers might benefi t from establishing a CMG. Additional 
information will be introduced with particular relevance to PNG and the 
Philippines.
Reasons for the Formation of CMGs
 Th e most recognized form of CMG is the cooperative, which is derived 
from the Rochdale cooperative of 1844 that was established to buy cheaper 
food. Th e International Cooperative Alliance (1995) outlines seven principles 
that defi ne a cooperative and diff erentiate it from an investor-owned fi rm 
(IOF): voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; 
member economic participation; autonomy and independence; education, 
training, and information; cooperation among cooperatives; and concern for 
community. 
 Th e key diff erence that distinguishes CMGs from IOFs is that members 
have two roles in CMGs: as patrons and as investors (Nilsson, 2001). 
Historically, CMGs have been formed for three main reasons: to increase 
bargaining power (a defensive reason), in response to government policy, and 
as an entrepreneurial activity (an off ensive reason).
Increase bargaining power—defensive reasons
 Farmers have established many successful cooperatives to protect 
themselves from situations of market power when faced with monopoly 
sellers or monopsony buyers (Murray-Prior, 2007). In the case of downstream 
processing, an additional factor has been the opportunity to take advantage of 
the economic rents associated with scope and size economies. It is important 
however to distinguish genuine monopoly or monopsony market power 
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situations from the widespread perceptions in transitional economies that 
market intermediaries are the cause of low prices (Lele, 1981; Milford, 2004; 
Murray-Prior, 2007). Th e reality is often quite diff erent, with low prices being 
due to other causes such as poor infrastructure, law and order issues, and a lack 
of enforceable legal contracts, which make it diffi  cult to develop marketing 
arrangements that reward quality (Murray-Prior et al., 2009).
 While cooperatives have a long history in the Philippines (Sibal, n.d.) 
and take many forms, they have a high failure rate. However, it is interesting 
to note that three of the top four cooperatives in Region IV of the Philippines 
selected by Castillo et al. (2003) have feed milling as their main line of business. 
While it is not clear whether they were established initially to compete with 
a monopoly seller, they are defi nitely in an industry that has considerable 
economies of size. In PNG, smallholder coff ee farmers are often encouraged 
to get into owning and managing wet and dry processing mills (CIC, 2002). 
However, while there are economies of size inherent in these mills, in most 
cases, there are other mills available and competition is fi erce, so market failure 
is generally not present.
Response to government policy 
 In many developed and developing countries, governments have promoted 
cooperatives, either through legislating legal and taxation advantages or as an 
element of government development policy (Nilsson, 2001; Milford, 2004). 
In the Philippines, there has been a long history of government promotion 
and initiation of cooperatives for development and political reasons (Sibal, 
n.d.; Briones, 2003). Th ese reasons have included improving agricultural 
development, distributing subsidized inputs and credit, and the pacifi cation 
of revolutionary activities. Th ere is general agreement that most cooperatives 
formed for these reasons have not been sustainable.
 In PNG, their history has been shorter, but colonial and independent 
governments have promoted their use. Colonial governments promoted both 
cooperatives and Rural Progress Societies, with the latter seen as forerunners 
to Cooperative Societies (Goldbold, 2006). Cooperatives were established 
throughout PNG in the 1970s and 1980s, but most have failed (Gustafsson, 
2002) and very few remain today. More recently, the Coff ee Industry 
Corporation adopted an eight-point plan, one point being “to promote and 
coordinate grower-owned systems of marketing” (CIC, 2002, p. 5). However, 
in practice there has been little government support for cooperatives.
Entrepreneurial cooperatives—off ensive reasons
 Entrepreneurial cooperatives have emerged following the development of 
new structures for cooperatives (such as New Generation cooperatives) arising 
from the work of New Institutional economists and their critiques of traditional 
cooperative forms (Cook and Plunkett, 2006). In these forms, the investor 
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role receives much greater emphasis and the objective is to create structures 
that make them more effi  cient than IOFs. Most of these cooperatives occur 
in the developed world, particularly in the USA, but these structures have 
not been widely adopted in the transitional economies. Th ey generally occur 
in processing industries and require high levels of management and capital, 
which make them generally unsuitable for smallholder farmers in transitional 
economies.
Reasons for Success and Failure of CMGs 
in Transitional Economies
 Th e cooperative sector in the Philippines is substantial, with around 
60,000 registered cooperatives in 2001, of which approximately 55% were 
multipurpose agricultural cooperatives and around 1% were marketing 
cooperatives (Briones, 2003). However, over 40% of these were nonoperational 
or dissolved and only around 3% submitted annual fi nancial reports required 
under law (Briones, 2003; Castillo et al., 2003). No recent statistics were 
obtained on the number and status of cooperatives in PNG, but some authors 
(Gustafsson, 2002; Goldbold, 2006) and anecdotal evidence suggest that there 
are very few successful cooperatives remaining.
 Apart from situations where there is a comparative advantage for 
cooperatives because of market failure problems, Murray-Prior (2007) identifi es 
several other success factors. In the case of milk marketing cooperatives, access 
to market opportunities, a clear marketing strategy, a competitive advantage, 
and matching supply to demand were important (Raju, 2004). Certifi cation 
schemes such as Fairtrade off er some advantages to small farmers, but they 
do not guarantee success and they still rely on a cooperative that has genuine 
commitment and participation of its members (Pirotte, Pleyers, and Poncelet, 
2006), along with the usual factors such as good management. While outside 
support also seems to contribute to success in many smallholder cooperatives, 
it is not suffi  cient (Holloway et al., 2000; Raju, 2004; Gonzales and Nigh, 
2005; Murray-Prior, 2007), and sustainability is a problem once the support 
organization withdraws (Shigetomi, 2006). 
 Government support can be benefi cial, but in many cases, it becomes 
more of a hindrance because the group becomes dependent on government 
and is subject to political interference and often corrupt and incompetent 
management (Milford, 2004; Gonzales and Nigh, 2005; Pirotte, Pleyers, and 
Poncelet, 2006). Th e situation in the Philippines seems to mirror that in other 
developing countries (Sibal, n.d.; Castillo et al., 2003). When a cooperative is 
formed in response to a government initiative, it tends to collapse once this 
support is removed.
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 According to Murray-Prior (2007), key factors associated with the success 
of CMGs are social factors such as the level of trust and social capital in the 
community. Th e level of trust within the community and between the CMG 
members and its managers and leaders has a positive eff ect on performance. 
Th is relates to social homogeneity within the community, with higher levels 
leading to lower transaction costs and an increased advantage over alternative 
structures for selling their produce. Th e size of the group is also negatively 
related to the level of trust and social homogeneity.
Social capital and trust in the Philippines
 Both the literature (Sibal, n.d.; Briones, 2003; Castillo et al., 2003) and 
anecdotal evidence from the Philippines of high failure rates in cooperatives, 
often due to corruption, incompetence, and mismanagement, corroborate the 
contention of low levels of trust between CMG members and their leaders 
and managers. Observations of cooperatives in the Kapatagan area support this 
notion; for example, one cooperative experienced trouble when the manager 
was away and the second in command absconded with the cooperative’s 
funds. However, while it is not clear whether trust is the foundation of social 
capital or the process of generating social capital improves levels of trust (Fox 
and Gershman, 2000), there is some evidence that the Philippines has lower 
levels of social capital than Th ailand (Shigetomi, 2006). Th is latter study of 
microfi nance organizations in Th ailand and the Philippines found that Th ailand 
had savings groups with an average of 80 members, whereas the Philippines 
requires much smaller numbers for success. Th e Grameen Bank model of a 
fi ve-member group was found to be suitable. Shigetomi (p. 14) attributes this 
to the more individualistic and unorganized nature of Philippine communities 
where “social ties among rural people depend more on dyadic relationships 
rather than the affi  liation to collectively formed groups” and the communal 
spirit is weak.
 An additional problem in the Philippines is the political and economic 
power structures that dominate the rural landscape (Lara and Morales, 1990). 
Th e exercise of power by a rural oligarchy through patron-client relationships, 
backed up by the military, police, and paramilitary forces, limits the ability of 
the numerically larger rural poor to exercise electoral and economic infl uence. 
Consequently, small farmers may have diffi  culty organizing collaborative 
marketing groups because of interventions by the rural elite who feels threatened 
by such developments (Briones, 2003).
Social capital and trust in PNG
 Levels of social capital and trust in PNG may also be low, although no 
direct comparison has been made or found with the Philippines. PNG has over 
850 separate languages with some scholars claiming there are more than 10,000 
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microsocieties (Reilly and Phillpot, 2002). Particularly in the highlands, which 
are characterized by a highly dissected landscape, there exist the most fl uid, 
aggressive, and competitive microsocieties, who engage in intermittent class 
warfare. Th e clans are horizontally structured, because the “big men” achieve 
status through competition rather than inheritance, with thousands of house 
lines, clans, and tribal groupings competing with one another for resources and 
public goods. Each group attempts to monopolize access to resources leading 
to the absence of benefi cial horizontal social relations.
 Reilly and Phillpot (2002) related the number of social groupings 
to measures of social capital and found a high negative correlation and a 
consequent negative correlation with the level of provincial development. Th ey 
hypothesized that this same heterogeneity negatively aff ected the development 
of norms of trust, cooperation, and reciprocity. Cooter (1991) suggests that 
kinsmen do not feel bound by bad decisions of “big men,” which may have 
negative eff ects on social cohesion. He further suggests that clan organizations 
have little in common with Western concepts of cooperative or corporate forms 
of organization.
 Table 1 provides some insight into the relationships within the farm 
communities associated with various types of coff ee chains in PNG. It suggests 
that the communities have some problems with social cohesion and trust. Only 
one-third believe that the members of their community can be trusted, while 
less than one-quarter strongly believe that their views will be considered or that 
people make a fair contribution to community activities. On the positive side, 
most people have confi dence in the village leadership.









People in my village or community can be trusted 33% 66% 1%
People in my community are likely to steal cherry 
from my trees
0% 44% 56%
People who do not participate in village or 
community activities will be criticized or fi ned
59% 32% 9%
Views of local people are taken into account before 
important village or community decisions
27% 72% 1%
I have confi dence in the local community 
leadership to manage confl ict in the community
77% 22% 1%
People in my village or community make a fair 
contribution to communal activities
19% 80% 1%
Source: Survey of farmers carried out as part of ACIAR project ASEM-2003-053 in the Eastern 
Highlands, Simbu, and Western Highlands provinces of PNG in 2006.
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 Th e combination of this evidence and that on problems with cooperatives 
in the coff ee industry and elsewhere suggest that CMGs are likely to struggle 
with trust issues in PNG.
Implications for the formation of CMGs 
in PNG and the Philippines
 Th e objective of this paper is to address the question of “if and under 
what conditions smallholder farmers in the Philippines and Papua New 
Guinea are likely to benefi t from forming collaborative marketing groups.” 
Th e specifi c evidence for PNG and the Philippines is consistent with the 
contention by Murray-Prior (2007) that two factors are necessary for the 
successful establishment of CMGs: a comparative advantage and a reasonable 
level of trust. CMG structures in these countries will need to address these two 
factors eff ectively if they are to increase their chances of success.
 In both countries, when CMGs attempt to compete in competitive 
market places, they are generally unsuccessful. For instance, CMGs who try 
to compete in the Philippines with middlemen supplying the wet market 
struggle because they are unlikely to be as effi  cient in an environment of poor 
infrastructure and related constraints. Similarly, in PNG, CMGs are unlikely 
to be competitive in supplying the traditional Y-grade coff ee market. In both 
instances, the markets are competitive, and CMGs will need to be able to 
deliver advantages that are superior to existing marketing arrangements if they 
are to be successful.
 Similarly, the evidence is that both countries do not have high levels 
of social capital and trust, which are essential for the eff ective and effi  cient 
operation of CMGs. Th is limits the size of CMGs that are likely to be successful. 
On the one hand, CMGs can be an advantage in trade and processing if there 
are economies of size and market failure in the delivery of these services. On 
the other, a large CMG will be likely to have governance and cooperation 
problems when its members are smallholder farmers who lack the literacy, 
numeracy, and management skills to govern a complex organization. In this 
case, it is likely to fail or be captured by elites who have these skills and who 
will direct the CMG towards their own interests.
 Th e converse is that small CMGs may be successful in marketing their 
members’ products provided the group’s size and composition coincides with 
existing traditional social structures that can maintain social control. In PNG 
and the Philippines, this would appear to be small because of the lack of strong 
horizontal relationships in the community. In PNG, this may correspond 
with “house lines,” while in the Philippines, around fi ve members as in the 
Grameen Bank model. Th e problem is that a small group may be able to meet 
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the needs of a small niche market, but will not be able to achieve economies of 
size or to participate in many of the institutional markets without joining other 
groups.
 Th ere are two possible solutions which appear to reduce this problem. One 
approach is the Normin Veggies model where small vegetable farmers sell their 
produce through a CMG, which, for a fee, facilitates the contracts but does 
not take possession of the product. Th is not only reduces the working capital 
requirement of the organization but also reduces the chance for corruption 
because they do not handle the money. However, most Normin farmers are 
commercial operators and have higher levels of literacy and management 
expertise than traditional semi-subsistence farmers. 
 Th e second approach is for a larger organization such as an NGO or a 
commercial company to link the small groups, supervise, and support the 
overarching organization. Catholic Relief Services in Maragusan is fulfi lling 
this role with clusters of vegetable farmers. Similarly, Coff ee Connections is 
supporting a number of Fairtrade and Organic cooperatives in PNG. Th e 
problem with this solution is that the overarching collaborative marketing 
organization would most likely collapse or decline signifi cantly without 
the support of the NGO or commercial organization. In this case, fi nding 
a solution that overcomes the need for continued support from an outside 
organization is the key to resolving this issue, but this is not easy.
 It appears to be as true in PNG and the Philippines as it is elsewhere in the 
developing world that state-sponsored cooperatives, which are set up as part of 
government development policy or to deliver input subsidies, will survive only 
as long as they receive government support. Furthermore, they are inherently 
susceptible to corruption and mismanagement. NGO-supported organizations 
will have the same problem of sustainability unless the NGO can build human 
and social capital through a truly participatory approach. Th is will not be a 
short-term problem. Shigetomi (2006, p. 3) says “such projects malfunction 
after the outside agencies retreat from the project site, suggesting that ‘making 
organizations’ is not the same as ‘making a system of making organizations.’ 
Th e latter is essential to make rural organizations self-reliant and sustainable.”
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